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THE FUTURE OF ENERGY: THE EUROPEAN
AND AMERICAN APPROACHES—
THE EUROPEAN APPROACH
Presentation by Dr. Go¨tz Reichert
My name is Go¨tz Reichert and I am head of the energy division of
the Center for European Policy, an independent think tank based in
Freiburg, Germany.  We analyze proposals of the European Commis-
sion for new legislation, which has an impact on all twenty-seven
Member States of the European Union.  I am a lawyer by training,
and four of my colleagues are economists.  We work together in teams
so that we have both the legal and economic perspective when we
analyze new legislative proposals.
My aim for this presentation today, is to give you a broad overview
of the diverse challenges the energy sector in Europe is confronted
with today and the various policy approaches of the European Union
in this respect.  In order to illustrate the European perspective on en-
ergy policy, part one of my presentation will illustrate important chal-
lenges European countries have to face, and the respective role of the
European Union in developing policy responses.  The second part of
my presentation will deal with the four major policy approaches in this
field: the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, the promotion of en-
ergy efficiency, the development of renewable sources of energy, and
finally, the necessary adaptation of the energy infrastructure.
But before dealing with these four policy approaches, let me briefly
outline the relevant regulatory setting in Europe.  When talking about
European energy policy, I am referring to the regulatory framework
of the European Union.  The European Union (“EU”) is an interna-
tional organization formed by twenty-seven Member States with over
500 million citizens.  The EU ranges from Sweden and Finland in the
north to the Mediterranean in the south, with countries like Spain,
Italy, Malta, and Cyprus.  You can imagine that these countries are
quite diverse in several respects, not only with regard to their size and
economic power, but also with regard to the natural preconditions for
using different energy sources.  For example, the island of Cyprus is
totally dependent on the import of fossil fuels.  Sweden, however, al-
ready has a comparatively high share of renewable energy, mostly
water power.  I would also like to mention my home country of Ger-
many.  You might have heard that Germany, after the accident at the
nuclear power station of Fukushima, Japan, decided to phase out the
use of nuclear power altogether.  In contrast, our neighboring country
319
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France will continue to use nuclear power, covering more than 75% of
its electricity production.1
Let me now turn to the overall policy framework of the EU, which
applies to all of its Member States.  If you think of the EU, you may
think of it as a kind of federal system.  Not all of my fellow lawyers in
Europe would accept this notion, but practically that is the way it is.
Due to the unique legal nature of the EU, its legislative measures
have a defining impact on its Member States.  One has to keep that in
mind when talking about European policy in general, and for the last
five years that has especially been true for energy policy.  It is essen-
tial that the law created by the institutions of the EU is binding and
enjoys primacy over the national energy law of the EU Member
States.  The EU can enact legislation on energy security, energy effi-
ciency, and renewable energy.  What remains to the exclusive legisla-
tive power of the EU Member States is the choice of their individual
energy mix.
So let us have a look at the overall energy mix in Europe: more than
75% of the total gross inland energy consumption consists of fossil
fuels like oil, natural gas, and coal.  There is still a considerable
amount of nuclear power in use (14%), and the share of renewable
energy amounts to 10%.2 The big issue in Europe, as opposed to the
United States, is the dependency on energy imports.  A conflict be-
tween Russia and the Ukraine, in January 2009, highlighted this de-
pendency.  The Ukraine is not a Member State of the EU, but the
pipeline for gas imports from Russia to the EU runs through the coun-
try.  Russia and the Ukraine could not agree on the conditions for the
respective transfer fees.  So what happened was that for about two
weeks, gas imports from Russia were cut off, and some European
countries experienced serious shortfalls in gas supplies in mid-winter.
This really showed the dependency of Europe on energy imports.
Now, the overall energy dependency of the EU is about 53.8% and it
amounts to 84.9% for oil and 67.0% for gas.3  If current trends con-
tinue, import levels of fossil fuels will reach more than 80% in the
year 2035.4  This is an unwanted scenario for a country dependent on
oil from unstable regions of the Earth.  Europeans have to realize that
worldwide there are countries with a huge hunger for energy and that
we are faced with rising competition for those resources.
Therefore, the EU has made the decision to “decarbonize” its en-
ergy system.  The long-term objective is to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions considerably.  That is the trigger of the entire energy policy
of the EU.  We want to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions by 80%
1.  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU ENERGY IN FIGURES—STATISTICAL POCKET-
BOOK 81 (2013).
2. Id. at 20.
3. Id. at 22.
4. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ENERGY CHALLENGES AND POLICY 2 (2013).
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to 95% below the level of 1990 by the year 2050.5  To this end, the EU
has set itself three headline targets: (1) until the year 2020, reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by 20% as compared to 1990; (2) increase
the share of renewable energy to 20%; and (3) increase energy savings
to 20% through energy efficiency.6
Let us start with the first major approach: the reduction of green-
house gas emissions.  Five years ago, this was the big problem to be
resolved in Europe, and the entire industrial policy of the EU was put
under that headline target.  The central instrument to achieve the re-
duction of greenhouse gas emissions is the so-called European Emis-
sion Trading System (“EU-ETS”). As still the biggest international
emission trading system in the world, the EU-ETS comprises 11,000
heavy energy-using installations, power plants, and industrial plants in
all twenty-seven Member States of the EU and also in some neighbor-
ing countries taking part in the EU-ETS.  Furthermore, the EU-ETS
also applies to the aviation sector covering flights from and to the EU.
The EU-ETS works on a “cap-and-trade” principle, and the total vol-
ume of the greenhouse gas emissions that can be emitted by factories,
power plants, and other installations covered by the system is limited
and put under an EU-wide emission cap.  Each year this cap is to be
reduced by 1.74% to ensure that in the year 2020 we will have a reduc-
tion by 21% of greenhouse gas emissions as compared to the year
2005.  If a company wants to emit greenhouse gases, it needs an allow-
ance to do that.  Each allowance gives a right to emit one ton of car-
bon dioxide (“CO2”), the main greenhouse gas, or the equivalent
amount of two more powerful greenhouse gases—nitrous oxide and
perfluorocarbons.  An allowance can be used only once, so companies
have to surrender the used allowances for each ton of greenhouse
gases they emit.  If they do not, they have to pay heavy fines and this
is enforced rigorously.  There are different ways for companies to re-
ceive such allowances: some get their allowances for free.  Companies
can also buy additional allowances at auctions or from other compa-
nies.  Emission allowances are the currency of the system.  If you put a
cap on the allowed emissions of greenhouse gases, you create an artifi-
cial market and the respective allowances get a monetary value.  This
creates a permanent incentive for companies to reduce their emis-
sions.  A company operating under the EU-ETS has various choices in
order to reduce its emissions: it may decide to invest in more efficient
technology or to shift to less carbon-intensive energy sources.  This
gives companies a chance to keep their allowances or to use them for
future emissions.  Or a company may sell its surplus allowances to an-
other company who has made the decision not to cut emissions if the
5. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMMUNICATION COM 885: ENERGY ROADMAP
2050 2 (2011).
6. COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, BRUSSELS EUROPEAN COUNCIL 8/9
MARCH 2007—CONCLUSIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY OF 2 MAY 2007 (2007).
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company determines that emission reduction costs are too expensive.
This flexibility of the trading system allows companies to choose the
most cost-effective options to address their emissions.  The hope is
that reductions will occur where the costs for doing so are at the
lowest.
We are just about to find out that there are several problems associ-
ated with this emission trading system.  One of them is the risk of
“carbon leakage.” Carbon leakage may occur—if due to the costs
caused by climate policies—businesses transfer production to other
countries outside the EU, which have less stringent constraints on
greenhouse gas emissions.  Globally, this could lead to an increase in
the overall amount of greenhouse gas emission: since climate change
is a global problem, carbon leakage caused by measures to fight cli-
mate change is obviously counterproductive and also weakening the
European economy.  This problem was seen before, and companies in
a competitive market worldwide receive allowances for free so that
they would not leave Europe.
Another problem high on the agenda in Europe, is the growing sur-
plus of emission allowances.  This growing surplus has resulted in ex-
tremely low prices for emission allowances.  There are several reasons
for the growing surplus, one of them is that the system was set up
before 2008.  In 2008, the economic crisis hit Europe quite signifi-
cantly, resulting in reduced production.  Consequently, less green-
house gases were emitted, and allowances were not used.  Another
reason for the surplus of allowances, is the growing success of the
other two approaches to energy policy—raising energy efficiency and
the share of renewable forms of energy.  By being successful in these
two fields, less fossil fuels are needed, which emits less greenhouse
gases, resulting in less need for emission allowances.  Therefore, the
prices for emission allowances at the moment are extremely low.  It is
estimated that in order to give an incentive to develop low carbon
technology and to force companies to reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions, the price for emitting one ton of CO2 needs to be at least
C= 40 or $52.  As of today, the price is as low as C= 2.75 or $3.60.  Conse-
quently, we have a big problem when it comes to this.  Just a few days
ago, there was a vote in the European Parliament about a proposal to
take emission allowances temporarily out of the system in order to
raise the price—the so-called “backloading” of allowances.  However,
the European Parliament did not accept this proposal.  It was argued
that artificially raising the price would be an inappropriate interfer-
ence into the market mechanism, merely putting additional financial
burdens on the European economy without any benefit to the overall
goal of protecting the global climate.
Furthermore, I just want to mention some other measures for re-
ducing greenhouse gas emissions which have already been taken.  As I
said before, there are 11,000 installations operating under the EU-
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ETS.  However, there are other sectors—transport, agriculture, hous-
ing, and so on—which are not covered by the system.  Generally
speaking, the whole policy on using greenhouse gas is targeted at us-
ing less fossil fuel.  Therefore, there are close links to the other two
policy areas—raising energy efficiency and the share of renewable en-
ergy—in order to decarbonize the European energy system.  Already,
the EU and its Member States have implemented a vast number of
different legislative instruments in this respect.  They cover different
sectors like housing and transport, and there are basically two ap-
proaches in this respect: one is labeling, and the other is setting bind-
ing requirements.
Labeling is an instrument to raise the awareness of consumers
about environmental impacts in general or energy efficiency in partic-
ular.  It actually works pretty well with some of the household appli-
ances.  Also, there is an interesting legislative act dealing with the
energy efficiency of buildings.  It requires that in the future a building
will need an energy certificate stating the energy requirement of a spe-
cific building.  If you want to sell a house or rent it out, you will have
to show it to the future buyer or tenant so that they know what they
can expect with regard to the energy performance of the building.
Another way of raising energy efficiency is defining efficiency require-
ments, for example on products—the so-called ecodesign approach.
This approach basically forces manufacturers to fulfill certain energy
efficiency requirements, and an example of such a result is conven-
tional electric light bulbs, which were phased out in Europe and are
no longer available.  You have to use new energy saving light bulbs.
More or less every product is in some way energy-related.  So if you
use very good insulating windows, they have an impact on the energy
needs of a house.
The third major approach of European energy policy I want to deal
with is the replacement of fossil fuels with renewable forms of energy
like solar energy, wind, or water power.  As I said before, European
countries have different potentials for using renewable energy.  There-
fore, the EU-wide 20% target for using renewable energy is split.  The
targets vary between 10% for Malta and 49% for Sweden.  EU Mem-
ber States are free to decide which means they want to deploy in order
to increase their share of renewable energy.  During the last decade,
Member States have developed quite diverse financial support
schemes for the promotion of renewable energy: they use instruments
such as investment aid, tax exemptions, and direct price support
schemes including feed-in tariffs and premium payments.  In Ger-
many, for example, electricity from renewable sources is promoted in
several ways: plants for the generation of electricity from renewable
sources like windmills or solar panels enjoy priority access to the elec-
tricity grid.  Therefore, those interested in feeding-in electricity to the
grid may demand the grid operator to expand his grid and enable their
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plants to be connected.  Furthermore, grid operators are obliged to
give priority to electricity from renewable sources when purchasing
and transmitting electricity.  The support system is based on a feed-in
tariff, which the grid operator must pay to the plant operators.  The
amount of the feed-in tariff is set by law and is guaranteed to be paid
over a period of twenty years.  These are quite favorable conditions.
If you go to the stock market, you cannot get a revenue like that.
Therefore, it is anything but surprising that the German financial sup-
port scheme with its guaranteed return on investment has been very
successful in raising the share of renewables within a short period of
time.  However, the system also causes a lot of problems.  First of all,
it is extremely expensive—raising energy prices considerably, espe-
cially for households.  Furthermore, the priority access of electricity
from renewable sources is already endangering the stability of the
electricity grid: production peeks—flooding the grid with too much
electricity from renewable sources—have become more frequent, pos-
ing a serious risk for blackouts.  The plants generating renewable en-
ergy are geographically much more distributed and often located far
away from cities and industrial centers.  Therefore, they require new
power lines to bring the electricity to the consumers.  Finally, the wind
does not always blow and the sun does not always shine.  Renewable
sources of energy are volatile, varying considerably throughout a day
or a year.  This requires backup-solutions like gas power stations or
storage facilities.  The need for new power lines, back-up solutions,
and new storage facilities shows that the integration of electricity gen-
erated from renewables sources requires an expensive redesign of the
entire electricity grid.  These are the problems we are faced with, and
we have not yet figured out how to bring all those policies together
and especially how to adapt our energy infrastructure.
Europe must urgently invest in its outdated and poorly intercon-
nected energy infrastructure in order to meet its energy and climate
objectives by 2020.  This concerns the entire energy infrastructure,
comprising electricity, natural gas, and oil, and ranging from transpor-
tation lines over distribution networks to storage facilities.  According
to the estimates of the European Commission,7 about one trillion Eu-
ros must be invested in the entire energy system by 2020 in order to
meet the EU’s energy and climate goals for 2020.  About C= 600 billion
will be required for energy networks—including distribution and
transmission networks, storage facilities, and smart grids.
Securing energy supplies in Europe has proven to be a challenging
and complex task.  It comprises various approaches to decarbonize the
European energy system, the most important of these approaches be-
ing reducing greenhouse gas emissions, promoting energy efficiency,
7. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE: PRIORITIES FOR 2020
AND BEYOND—A BLUEPRINT FOR AN INTEGRATED EUROPEAN ENERGY NETWORK 8
(2010).
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developing renewable sources of energy, and adapting the energy in-
frastructure.  I know that distinct differences exist between energy
policies pursued in the European Union and the United States of
America.  Therefore, I welcome the opportunity to learn more about
American energy policy today.
Thank you very much.
EU-27 GROSS INLAND CONSUMPTION 2011/ENERGY MIX (%)
Source: Eurostat April 2013
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